The latest issue of Joint Force Quarterly contains a valuable article by NSA analyst Dennis Penn titled USAFRICOM: The Militarization of US Foreign Policy? The article is based on an essay written at the US Army War College earlier in the year for which Penn won an award for Outstanding Strategy Research Paper.
The analysis is not new. The most impressive to date has been the work of Stewart Patrick and Kaysie Brown at the Center for Global Development who in "The Pentagon and Global Development: Making Sense of the DOD's Expanding Role" last November pointed out that the de facto dominance of GWOT, Afghanistan and Iraq in US Policy pushed resources in the direction of the military. While Penn describes the increasing importance of non-military "Phase Zero" pre-conflict operations, Patrick and Brown focus on post-conflict non-military operations in Afhanistan and Iraq.
[T]he Pentagon has also pioneered an innovative new institutional vehicle to promote greater integration of US-government-wide stabilization and reconstruction efforts in those countries, called Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs).... The idea was to create small teams comprised of the military and civilian agencies that would provide security while running quick-impact projects that would win the hearts and minds of the local population. ... Although touted as a marriage of equals between civilian and military actors, PRTs in Afghanistan are overwhelmingly military in scope and operation.
On Africa Patrick and Brown conclude
Generally speaking, the US military is not well equipped, by its mandate and personnel, to expertly address the structural sources of underdevelopment, alienation and instability in target countries.
A third study, testimony by John Pendleton of the GAO before the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform in July, voices civilian concerns.
Although DOD has often stated that AFRICOM is intended to support, not lead, US diplomatic and development efforts in Africa, State Department officials expressed concern that AFRICOM would become the lead for all US government activities in Africa, even though the US embassy leads decision-making on US government non-combat activities conducted in that country. Other State and USAID officials noted that the creation of AFRICOM could blur traditional boundaries among diplomacy, development and defense(3D), thereby militarizing US foreign policy.
Penn himself concludes
The critical question is why the military is leading an organisation whose stated mission is, by definition, largely the responsibility of State. ... Intentional or not, the Government is, via its implementation of USAFRICOM, feeding the perception of a militarization of US foreign policy.
All three studies recognise that the civilian agencies are so understrength - there are more people employed as musicians in military bands than in the entire foreign service! - and under-resourced that they are incapable of meeting their side of the bargain in interagency projects. Pendleton reports that AFRICOM initially planned to staff 25 percent of its headquarters with non-DOD personnel, reduced this to 4 percent (52 positions) but has actually only employed 13.
Penn takes his conclusions one step further than the other studies. He plunges, correctly I believe, beyond foreign assistance reform, into the more central issue of National Security Reform.
To improve unity of effort, reduce peer competition, and mitigate perceptions of the militarization of foreign policy, a forward-deployed National Security Council (NSC)-level representative should be established to oversee 3D efforts in each region.