The Islamic Courts Union appears to be going from strength to strength in consolidating its control over the southern regions of Somalia. Michael Weinstein has a very useful piece at Garowe Online which looks at their resurgence since being driven out of Mogadishu by the Ethiopians in December 2006.
Their successes, Weinstein argues, have come from learning the lessons of the 2006 defeat.
The successes of the Courts movement on the ground are due to a consistent and prudent strategy that is not the product of design, but of convergence of the viewpoints of its components, and that indicates learning from defeat. As is the case with all revolutionary movements, the Courts in their early revolutionary phase over-valued their strength and support, and under-valued the strength and resolve of their external adversaries, Ethiopia and the Western donor powers to Somalia led by the United States. ........
In 2008, the strategy matured as the Courts began to hold and administer territory, forging alliances with local sub-clans; that is, rather than aspiring to institute an Islamic state based on Shari'a law in one fell swoop, the Courts movement has now dug in at the local level, accommodating to local differences by setting up Courts administrations where it can, mixed administrations as a rule and benevolently neutral administrations where it must. This flexibility and respect for local power structures and sentiment have allowed the movement to take root and gain back a measure of the popular legitimacy that it had lost when revolution came to ruin.
The problem is, can they maintain unity, or will the three ideological strands represented in their ranks - Jihadism, Islamic Nationalism and pragmatism - drive them apart.
Having taken control of Kismayo, the Courts movement has gained confidence and
now envisages a genuine possibility that it will prevail in Somalia. With its success, however, new problems arise for the movement - as its components sense a possible victory, they have begun to think not only of removing the Ethiopian occupation, but also of which of them will dominate the re-liberation process and which vision of the desired future might be actualized.
It is only to be expected that rifts would appear in the ranks of the Courts movement on the ground, because its components share sufficient confidence to compete for influence among themselves - and that has happened in Middle Shabelle and seems to be occurring in Kismayo. How the Courts movement handles internal competition will in great part determine whether it maintains its role as protagonist and continues to deepen its roots and spread its branches, or whether it breaks down in mutual hostility and cuts itself apart in fragments in the familiar pattern of Somali factionalism: the Courts are at a cross roads.
The international agenda would appear to be set on ensuring that the ICU does in fact implode. This approach is short-sighted in the extreme. As Weinstein concludes:
A collapse into in-fighting by the Courts on the ground will mean yet a further descent into political entropy for Somalia - a fragmenting dynamic to compound the ruptures within the T.F.G. and the A.R.S., persistent clan divisions, and freelancing militias and criminal gangs.
Priority number one for the people of Somalia has to be peace, stability and governance. The rest can follow.
